Craig v. Holsey. (August 9, 1998) $200,000 in punitive damages
August 9, 1998 Rodney Leroy Craig, while he was on probation, smoked two marijuana cigarettes, drank six beers and eight ounces of straight gin, then crashed his car into the back of a car driven by Tamika Holsey, pushing her car into the lane of oncoming traffic. Craig then fled the scene. Craig’s blood alcohol level was 0.169 three hours after the accident. He eventually pled guilty to leaving the scene of an accident, following too closely, and driving under the influence. His sentence included 30 months of probation. Holsey sustained injuries in the accident. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict of $8,801.40 in actual and compensatory damages and, following a separate hearing, $200,000 in punitive damages.
O.C.G.A. §51-12-5 imposes a cap of $250,000.00 on punitive damages per plaintiff and per defendant. The cap can be stacked if there are multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants. This cap is waived with regard to torts where the defendant acted or failed to act with a specific intent to injure or while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
Under Georgia law when an individual operates a motor vehicle under the influence and causes injury, he or she is exposed to large punitive damages awards even with special damages are under $10,000.00
Note, there was only approximately $8,000.00 in specials in Craig. Despite the absence of a high special damage claim, there was still a $200,000.00 punitive damage award turned over to the Plaintiff. The basis for such a high verdict was that under Georgia civil laws, jurors are urged not to focus so much on the amount of special damages but more on the “potential harm”, which can result from a defendant’s negligent choice to operate a vehicle in violation of Georgia criminal, DUI statues.
Rodney Leroy Craig appeals a verdict and judgment against him arising out of a car accident he caused while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. He contends the trial court failed to enforce a settlement agreement, that the court made two evidentiary errors, and that the award of punitive damages was unconstitutional.
Punitive damages are recoverable only where “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1(b). During the punitive damages phase of the trial, the court may receive evidence that “is relevant to a decision regarding what amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1(d)(2).
The most important factor involving the reasonableness of a punitive damage award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct which requires that we consider whether the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic. Was the drivers conduct judged to be an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others? Was the driver responsible for harm as the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or merely an accident. Of these factors, three are present here: (1) Craig caused physical harm; (2) he acted in reckless disregard of the safety of others by driving after drinking and using drugs and by fleeing the scene; and (3) he has driven repeatedly after drinking or smoking marijuana. Adding to Craig’s reckless disregard is the fact that he admitted that he was aware of the deleterious combined effect of drinking and smoking marijuana on one’s ability to drive, that he did so anyway just because he simply felt like it, and that his drinking and drug use were a violation of probation.
The second guidepost is the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S. Ct. 1589. Here, Holsey could have died as a result of Craig’s driving under the influence. Thus, the “potential harm” was much greater than the actual. See Hosp. Auth of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 261 Ga 613, 615(1), 409 S.E.2d 501 (1991) (punitive damages award consistent with potential ensuing injuries) O.C.G.A. §51-12-5.1 itself informs the public that the $250, 000 cap on punitive damages in this state does not apply to torts where the defendant acted or failed to act while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other judgment-altering substances.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f). This legislation informs the public that this type of conduct is subject to large penalties. In summary, the award of punitive damages in this case was not grossly excessive so as to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 264 Ga. App. 344-350.
Regardless of the outcome, I have witnessed firsthand in every trial dealing with DUI or alcohol related charges, nearly every individual in the jury raises his or her hand in voir dire when either attorneys asks whether anyone in the potential jury pool has “…ever been negatively affected by alcohol?” Simply put, people despise drunks or drunk drivers that cause injury to innocent people.
One final point should be made regarding my prior experience with DUI representation. Specifically, even though my firm’s current focus is in the area of personal injury litigation, my firm’s early success was due largely in-part from the fruits of my DUI defense. My representation fostered such results that one of my cases made headlines and the feature story on TV news – - in favor of my client. Given the subject matter being so specific to DUI matters, it appears that I am the only attorney in US history ever to have a case make headlines due the strategies employed in the DUI representation. Among other articles referencing my representation, I have the same framed on the wall in my office. Simply put, my prior experience in DUI defense has made me surgical with plaintiff DUI, injury litigation.
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